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Today our security environment has changed dramatically and institutions 
which defend our continent against common threats must adapt to remain viable.  
Otherwise, the safety, security, and economic prosperity of North America will be 
in jeopardy.  The World Trade Center attack demonstrated that asymmetric 
threats can approach the U.S. from any direction.  This attack also reinforced the 
fact that natural and technological disasters can have international 
consequences and continental impact.  Given this statement, a noticeable 
missing element in our defense relationship with Canada and Mexico is the 
absence of a formal policy for bilateral military cooperation in support of civil 
authorities.  Also missing is a Mexican defense coordinating presence at NORAD 
and USNORTHCOM.  Southern aerospace, maritime, and land approaches to 
the U.S. are just as important as the northern approaches with respect to an 
attack or consequence management operations.  The absence of common 
border area military interaction and cooperation limits options and capabilities 
that can be leveraged against binational disasters and events of continental 
significance. 
This thesis examines shared U.S.-Mexican security challenges and 
argues that a bilateral transnational emergency management framework, which 
incorporates a civil-military partnership, can serve as the cornerstone upon which 
North American defense can be built.  To achieve this outcome, the existing 
Pacific Northwest emergency management cross-border agreements and the 
role of the National Guard are examined as models for establishing a regionally 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We all are working to consolidate the democratic progress in our 
region; to set military priorities in our democratic societies; to 
identify and better understand the new threats of the 21st century; 
and to transform our military capabilities to meet those emerging 
threats, individually and collectively.1
Donald Rumsfeld 
U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Meeting of Western Hemisphere Defense Ministers 
 
On April 30, 2002, President Bush signed a new Department of Defense 
(DOD) Unified Command Plan (UCP), which went into effect on October 1, 
2002.2  Among other things, the UCP established the United States Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM) to provide command and control of the DOD 
homeland defense efforts and to coordinate military support to civil authorities.3  
Part of this defense effort is to coordinate and cultivate defense and security 
relationships with countries in its designated area of responsibility (AOR) which 
includes Canada and Mexico.  Fortunately, the United States (U.S.) enjoys a 
strong and sophisticated defense partnership with its northern neighbor Canada 
in organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).  Relations with 
Mexico, on the other hand, are not as comprehensive and expanded defense 
cooperation is lagging due to historic and political differences.  With both Canada 
and Mexico, policy and supporting structures do not formally exist for efficient 
and seamless military-to-military cooperation in support of civil authorities.  
Closing this gap can serve as a platform for expanding U.S.-Mexican military 
cooperation and be the first step toward an integrated North American defense. 
 
1 Donald Rumsfeld, Meeting of Western Hemisphere Defense Ministers, November 19, 2002. 
Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. 
2 Scott Shepherd and Steve Bowman, “Homeland Security: Establishment and 
Implementation of the United States Northern Command,” Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress (CRS Order Code RS21322), 1. Available at 




Today our security environment has changed dramatically and institutions 
which defend our continent against common threats must adapt to remain viable.  
If they do not adapt, the safety, security, and economic prosperity of North 
America will be in jeopardy.  Recent terrorist activity against the United States, 
including the World Trade Center attacks and attempted attacks related to the 
Millennium plots demonstrated that asymmetric threats can approach U.S. 
borders from any direction.  They also demonstrated that the armed forces, 
particularly the National Guard can provide civil authorities immediate support 
and capability.  This attack also reinforced the fact that natural and technological 
disasters can have binational consequences and continental impact.  Given this 
statement, a noticeable missing element in our defense relationship with Canada 
and Mexico is the absence of a formal policy for bilateral military cooperation in 
support of civil authorities.  Also missing is a Mexican defense coordinating 
presence at NORAD and USNORTHCOM. 
Southern aerospace, maritime, and land approaches to the U.S. are just 
as important as the northern approaches with respect to an attack or 
consequence management operations.  The absence of border area military 
interaction and cooperation limits our options and capabilities that can be 
leveraged against binational disasters and events of continental significance.  
This thesis examines shared U.S.-Mexican security challenges and argues that a 
bilateral transnational emergency management framework, which incorporates a 
civil-military partnership, can serve as the cornerstone upon which North 
American defense can be built.  To achieve this outcome, the existing Pacific 
Northwest emergency management cross-border agreements and the role of the 
National Guard are examined as models for establishing a regionally based 
emergency management structure. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Economic trade between the United States, Canada, and Mexico has 
exploded over the last decade improving the welfare of each nation.  Yet today, 
we do not have a mature security relationship that can deter or prevent 
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asymmetric aggression and protect our interdependency.  Security cooperation 
programs in place prior to 9/11 failed to adequately address the reality of the 
evolving security environment.  In retrospect, it is clear U.S. unilateral action 
following the attacks on 9/11 bolstered the aims of al-Qaeda by creating 
additional economic havoc.  Closed borders and grounded air traffic affected the 
entire economy of North America.  Today, borders continue to remain vulnerable 
despite well-intentioned efforts to control them. 
The significance of continental security cooperation cannot be 
understated.  Canada and Mexico are the United States’ largest trading partners, 
and vice versa.  The Institute for Research on Public Policy points out in its 
“Roadmap for a Treaty of North America” that one of the foundations of any 
community must be security, writ large.4  Under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. trade relationship is 
predominately free of tariffs, which resulted in trade of over $625 billion in 2003.5  
U.S. energy security is dependent on Canada as its largest supplier of foreign 
energy and we are joined together on a common electricity grid.  Shawn 
Smallman points out in “Canada’s New Role in North American Energy Security” 
that the U.S. imports more oil from Canada than it does from any single source in 
the Middle East.  Similarly, Mexico supplies the U.S. with vast amounts of energy 
and other forms of critical infrastructure.  Security cooperation with Mexico and 
Canada takes on a new level of importance when U.S. national security is 
threatened by attacks on foreign infrastructure. 
Even though the continent wide economic shock waves generated by 9/11 
have led to incremental changes along the borders, formalized military-to-military 
national protocols, procedures, and mechanisms do not exist to effectively deal 
with binational issues affecting our nations if an attack or disaster occurs.  
Excluding NORAD’s air defense mission and NATO, only ad hoc relationships 
 
4 Thomas Courchene, Donald Savole, and Daniel Schwanen, “Deeper, Broader: A Roadmap 
for a Treaty of North America,” The Art of State Vol. 2, No. 4 (Montreal: The Institute for Research 
on Public Policy, 2004), 13. 
5 U.S. Embassy in Mexico, 2003 Trade, Available at http://www.usembassy-
mexico.gov/eataglance1.htm [Accessed November 2004]. 
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exist between the U.S. and Canadian military.  Further, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and its Canadian and Mexican equivalents have 
limited relationships that address binational homeland security and emergency 
response issues.  Similarly, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
recently pointed out that no comprehensive strategies exist between the U.S. and 
Mexico for managing cross-border catastrophic events.6  Military cooperation 
with Mexico is almost non-existent outside of foreign military sales and training 
despite USNORTHCOM’s efforts to develop cross-border cooperation.  This is 
problematic because homeland security and defense responsibilities overlap and 
a binational catastrophic event will require multinational interagency coordination 
that may demand the resources and capability of the military.  Richard Haass, 
Director of Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, gave an address in 
April 2002 in which he said, “In the twenty-first century, the principal aim of 
American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into 
arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values, 
and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice as widely as possible.”7  In 
order for the U.S. to promote these ideals, it must secure itself at home and 
demonstrate integration leadership. 
In a research policy paper published at the Naval War College, Bruce 
Grissom points out in “NORTHCOM Revisited:  Trinational Prospects for 
Continental Security,” that all three countries have an interest in a multinational 
security organization and suggests that USNORTHCOM should be structured to 
lead both military and civilian agencies in the security realm.8  While this is a 
possible solution to continental security, what is not addressed is how to create a 
political environment in which this outcome is possible.  This is already 
 
6 United States - Mexico Binational Council, US-Mexico Border Security and the Evolving 
Security Relationship: Recommendations for Policymakers (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, April 2004), 21. 
7 Richard Haass, The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, 
New York, April 2002. Available at http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632pf.htm [Accessed December 
2004]. 
8 Bruce Grissom, NORTHCOM Revisited: Tri-National Prospects for Continental Security, 
February 2004. Available at http://library.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/dtic/ADA422801.pdf 
[Accessed November 2004]. 
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problematic within the context of the U.S. civil-military relations since civilian 
agencies have traditionally taken the lead in responding to domestic 
contingencies, yet attempting to build a cooperative relationship with Mexico may 
be even more complicated.  Based on Mexican interactions to date, trilateral 
security and military cooperation will take decades to evolve without a practical 
engagement strategy.  Solutions proposed in a unilateral vacuum, no matter how 
good they are, will likely be resisted. 
Assessing the security cooperation programs that currently exist against 
perceived threats and vulnerabilities can serve as a foundation for honing 
existing cooperation programs and future policy efforts to strengthen continental 
defense and security.  Several bodies of work exist examining these topics 
individually, however, nothing exists that synthesizes comprehensive continental 
security cooperation activities against vulnerabilities.  Consequently, a 
vulnerability analysis from a continental perspective and a practical engagement 
strategy at the strategic level has yet to be developed. 
In “Canada Alert: Trade and Security in North America the Importance of 
Big Ideas”, Dwight Mason points out that the evolution of the Canada-U.S. 
defense relationship since WWII can serve a potential model for the future 
management of security and trade issues in North America.9  Mason further 
suggests that the asymmetry in the [Canada-U.S.] bilateral relationship combined 
with the diversity of the domestic actors in the U.S. basic policy proposals 
regarding the future of defense will have to originate in Canada.10  Unfortunately, 
Mason’s argument is limited to Canada and is restricted to defense.  Expanding 
this concept in scope by including “security” and projecting an analysis of the 
Canada-U.S. defense relationship onto a Mexican framework can lead to policy 
options for developing the U.S.-Mexican relationship.  It also points out that given 
Mexico’s reluctance to engage in the discussion on binational security, the U.S.  
 
 
9 Dwight Mason, “Canada Alert: Trade and Security in North America the Importance of Big 
Ideas,” July 2004. Available at http://www.csis.org/americas/pubs/hf_v12_09.pdf [Accessed 
August 8, 2005]. 
10 Ibid. 
6 
will have to take the lead, resolve the policy disputes among its domestic actors 
and develop a coherent strategy for improving its relationship with Mexico on this 
set of issues. 
Homeland defense and security are top priorities in every nation.  For over 
a half-century, the U.S. and Canada have worked together militarily and 
diplomatically resulting in sustained security and economic prosperity for 
themselves and hemispheric neighbors.  Today however, this relationship must 
be extended to Mexico to safeguard continental prosperity and a strategy is 
needed to engage its military. 
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II begins with an examination of why Mexican military cooperation 
is important to U.S. security and in particular USNORTHCOM.  Common threats 
that both nations share and the evolving security environment as well as the role 
of the military is discussed.  Additionally, the growing importance of bilateral 
management of binational disasters and the lack of military involvement in 
binational consequence management planning as well as the growing economic 
interdependencies between U.S. and Mexico are explored.  Lastly, a qualitative 
analysis regarding the state of cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican 
military is presented. 
An analysis of strategic Canadian-U.S. defense relationships is presented 
in Chapter III to suggest how similar arrangements can be developed with 
Mexico.  Canada is ideal for this comparison because it enjoys a mature defense 
relationship with the U.S.  Based on this analysis, a U.S.-Mexican defense 
planning architecture is discussed as a solution that can address the current 
strategic planning gap that exists.  Further, the use of the National Guard as an 
emergency management state partner is recommended as the first step to 
establish an operational military relationship with Mexico. 
Chapter IV explores permitting state governors the authority to order 
National Guard forces to assist in cross-border emergency management 
operations.  Provided that military support is allowed and the transnational 
7 
emergency management arrangements incorporate bilateral military participation, 
similar arrangements with Mexico can then be pursued as a politically acceptable 
demonstrated method for enhanced military cooperation.  Finally, chapter V 
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II. IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-MEXICAN MILITARY 
COOPERATION 
The Mexican government is working to achieve coordination with its 
partners in the United States and Canada and to make this region 
the most competitive and safest in the world.11
- President Vicente Fox 
Mexico is the only country that shares the U.S. southern land border.  
Since our common modern national territory boundaries were determined 
following the U.S.-Mexican War, our relationship with Mexico has been of interest 
to military planners, political leaders, and the business community.  While a lot 
can be said about why Mexico should distrust or not cooperate with the U.S., the 
purpose of this chapter is to emphasize the importance of and need to develop a 
mature relationship for both nations that is of mutual benefit politically, 
economically and socially. 
A. COMMON THREATS 
Mexico and the U.S. share roughly 2,000 miles of land, maritime, and 
aerospace borders that must be defended against aggression and safeguarded 
from unlawful activities to ensure national sovereignty and integrity.  Given the 
enormous size of the border, the U.S. alone cannot physically or financially 
support the defense of all maritime, aerospace, and land approaches adequately.  
Border areas are entry points for aggression and defeating threats in each of the 
domains will require efficient and robust military and diplomatic cooperation.  For 
decades the U.S. and Canada have successfully used NORAD to address the 
strategic aerospace threat.  Today NORAD patrols against the more likely hijack 
scenario and maritime options are now being considered.  This defensive 
partnership and aerospace layer ends at the U.S.-Mexican border and must be 
extended and expanded to adequately protect U.S. security interests and 
 
11 President of the Republic of Mexico Website, Mexico, United States and Canada Establish 
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, March 23, 2005. Available at 
http://envivo.presidencia.gob.mx/?P=2&Orden=Leer&Art=9202 [Accessed August 8, 2005]. 
10 
                                           
eliminate this open seam.  The DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support recognizes this necessity and describes an active layered defense as 
needed to protect the United States by seamlessly integrating its capabilities in 
forward regions of the world and in the geographic approaches to U.S. territory.12
Both Mexico and the U.S. acknowledge that a traditional strategic threat 
does not exist so a relationship based on defending against an invading external 
enemy is out of the question.  The days when Mexico and the U.S. cooperated 
militarily against a common enemy, as they did in World War II, are over.  The 
definition of a strategic threat, however, has evolved over the last decade and 
transnational problems such as terrorism, drug interdiction, and human 
smuggling now represent the new strategic enemies that challenge the security 
of both nations.  Historically these problems have been addressed by law 
enforcement, but as the scope and intensity has escalated over the last decade 
the military has increasingly played a larger role in supporting civil operations.  
Consequently, in the U.S. and Mexico today, the military frequently provides 
support to law enforcement activities.  Military aircraft are routinely used as 
sensor platforms, land forces augment border control efforts, and maritime 
assets from the Coast Guard and Navy engage in law enforcement operations.  
Not surprisingly, the one area where the U.S. and Mexican military do cooperate 
is the “war on drugs” because of the multiple benefits that it affords to both 
governments. 
B. BINATIONAL DISASTERS 
Seamless cooperation along border areas is imperative because they are 
potential flash points for binational disasters.  The massive amount of economic 
and industrial activity near major border crossings present unique binational 
emergency management challenges.  To put this into perspective, the 
Department of Transportation recorded 193 million passenger crossings in 
personal vehicles and 12.6 million loaded trucks entering the U.S. from Mexico in 
2003.  The binational trade corridors depicted in Figure 1 illustrates the 
 
12 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 
Washington, D.C., June 2005, 1. 
magnitude of this interconnectivity.  Moreover, hundreds of industrial production 
facilities known as "maquiladoras” along border cities such as Tijuana, Ciudad 
Juárez and Matamoros pose an industrial risk to both Mexican and U.S. 
communities. 
 
Figure 1.   Binational Trade Corridors13 
Adding to this danger are the byproducts of industrialization along the 
border.  Figure 2 depicts the major and proposed commercial hazardous and 







                                            
13 McCray Research, U.S.-Mexico Joint Working Committee on Transportation Planning, 




Figure 2.   Major Proposed and Existing Commercial Hazardous and  
Radioactive Waste Facilities in the Border Region14 
Fortunately, local, state, and federal agencies in Mexico and the U.S. are 
collaborating to address binational disasters.  Comprehensive “Sister City” plans 
exist for all major population centers along the border and most have been 
exercised.  The plans call for police, fire, paramedics, and other workers from 
both sides of the border to respond quickly to help each other with large fires, 
dangerous chemical spills, or other emergencies and plans address everything 
from logistics support and funding to liability and customs questions.15  After 
conducting a review of these plans, the noticeable missing element is the role of 
the Mexican and U.S. military as supporting agencies.  This flaw in planning 
creates a gap in preparing for catastrophic emergencies because when a crisis 
                                            
14 México and Texas Center for Policy Studies and Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre 
Comercio (RMALC) La Neta – Proyecto Emisiones: Espacio Virtual, Hazardous Waste 
Management in the United States – Mexico Border States: More Questions than Answers, 2nd ed. 
Austin, TX/México City, D.F., March 2000, 44. Available at 
http://www.texascenter.org/publications/haz2000.pdf [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, In the News – U.S.-Mexico Border. Available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region06/6xa/border_sister_cities.htm [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
12 
exceeds the capability of local, state, and federal civil response efforts, military 
assets in both Mexico and the U.S. may be required and directed to assist in 
consequence management operations.  Moreover, the National Guard, which is a 
key participant in every state emergency management structure, is not 
recognized as an integrated support agency.  Given that the National Guard 
provides unique capability such as identifying chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) agents/substances with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support Teams, their inclusion in planning that may demand 
specialized capability is imperative.  Additionally, all North American countries 
use a graduated emergency response model similar to the one depicted in Figure 
3 to escalate resource requests for emergency responses.  For each nation, a 
predetermined threshold is established typically at the federal level, where 
military assets may be directed to support civil authorities.  In the U.S., the 
National Guard is centered in the middle of the emergency response triangle and 
can move vertically up and down rapidly to address emergency management 
requirements under the authority of a Governor or the President.  Naturally, 
potential binational incidents are more effectively addressed locally so excluding 
an available cross-border partner is unwise. 
 
Figure 3.   Emergency Response Triangle 
Traditionally, the military has participated in a wide range of missions 
when directed and supporting civil requests for disaster relief is nothing new.  
13 
14 
                                           
War, as the Clausewitzian saying goes, is the extension of politics by other 
means.  Likewise, military support to civil authority is an extension of politics.  For 
military planners in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, the spectrum of domestic 
military operations that have emerged over the last decade can be categorized 
into five major areas, which are depicted in Figure 4.  This spectrum progresses 
from natural threats on the left to operations that are purely defensive on the right 
and each of these areas is implied in the mission of USNORTHCOM for U.S. 
only domestic operations.  The first block (1) represents defense support for 
benign consequence management operations.16  These operations directly 
support a lead civil agency.  Examples of this type of mission include assisting 
relief efforts for natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes.  The second 
block (2) represents those consequence management operations that require 
specialized capability that is unique to the military.  For example, a CBRNE 
consequence management operation that requires large-scale mortuary 
capability that only the military can support.  The third block (3) represents 
homeland security missions that require military assistance for mission 
accomplishment.  An example of this is military units supporting border patrol 
activities or drug interdiction.  The fourth block (4) represents those homeland 
security and homeland defense missions, where the DOD may, or may not, be 
the lead federal agency.  An example of this scenario is a maritime interdiction 
operation using the U.S. Coast Guard in its dual civil-military role.  Finally, the 
last block (5) represents homeland defense missions, where the military is in the 
lead and is the supported agency.  An example of this is a strategic bomber 
attack or a land invasion. 
While these categories may appear as obvious and logical mission sets 
for cooperation, coordination of many of these activities with our national 
neighbors occurs informally or not at all.  In Mexico, the defense plan for disaster 
relief, Plan DN-IIIE and the comparable U.S. FUNCPLAN 2501 outline how our 
respective military forces will assist civil relief efforts domestically, but do not 
 
16 Benign used here refers to consequence management operations that do not require the 
use of force. 
synchronize with each other and do not address binational situations.  As 
described, these missions are not offensive in nature; rather their aim is to 
support national integrity, sovereignty, and security. 
 
Figure 4.   Spectrum of Military Operations 
The gap that exists with consequence management planning in border 
areas ignores the important role of the military articulated in national plans and 
operations will suffer if defense capability is required for binational catastrophes.  
Policies, protocols, and mechanisms need to be established in advance to speed 
response efforts so lives can be saved and property protected. 
C. ECONOMIC PROSPERITY 
Military cooperation that enhances U.S.-Mexican security is critical 
because the economic prosperity enjoyed by both countries must be protected to 
ensure regional stability.  With over $625 billion in trade between the U.S., 
Mexico, and Canada in 2003, it is clear that interruptions to this interdependency 
will have a significant impact on all three economies.17  Since the passage of 
NAFTA, the Mexican economy has grown tremendously, which has benefited its 
democratic institutions and has allowed for positive political change.  An example 
of this change is President Fox's election as the first non-Institutional 
                                            
17 U.S. Embassy in Mexico, 2003 Trade. Available at http://www.usembassy-
mexico.gov/eataglance1.htm [Accessed November 2004]. 
15 
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Revolutionary Party president in modern Mexican history.  In addition to this, 
Mexican economic prosperity reduces immigration pressure on the United States 
by providing job opportunities and an improved standard of living in Mexico. 
Economic prosperity also implies that more resources will be available for 
modernizing and training Mexican defense forces.  A well-equipped, trained, and 
financed military will help further Mexican democratic goals by providing a 
dependable national resource that can assist with internal and external security 
issues that are of importance to the region.  This in turn will reinforce democratic 
growth and regional stability.  For USNORTHCOM a modernized and more 
capable Mexican military enhances North American security because their forces 
would be better able to defeat and deter symmetric and asymmetric threats such 
as terrorists, insurgency, and the illegal drug trade.  In addition to providing a 
more robust internal and external security posture, the Mexican military's ability 
to assist in civic affairs would be enhanced.  Also, a stronger Mexican military 
eases the costs of the continental defense burden and improves security 
between both countries. 
Lastly, increased economic interdependencies have placed a new and 
growing emphasis on critical infrastructure that is shared between the two 
nations.  Energy, agriculture, and water in particular, are vital resources that 
significantly contribute to the health of each nation.  In March 2002, the U.S. and 
Mexico signed the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan, a 22-point plan 
that examines trans-border infrastructure and communication and transportation 
networks and their associated vulnerabilities in order to identify critical trans-
border infrastructure protection deficiencies, and to take measures to remedy 
them.18  While critical infrastructure is clearly a security issue, the potential exists 
for military involvement as a supporting or supported agency if problems arise 
that cannot be addressed by private or public safety agencies. 
 
 
18 For more information on the U.S. - Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/usmxborder/22points.html.  
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D. STATE OF COOPERATION 
U.S.-Mexican military cooperation enhances North American security, 
which in turn promotes open markets, commerce, and regional stability.  
Unfortunately, the U.S.-Mexican military planning gap is not an oversight.  The 
relationship between the defense establishments has a long history of strained 
relations.  Aside from historic Mexican bitterness over the outcome of the U.S.-
Mexican War and years of internal and externally fueled anti-Americanism, the 
Mexican military has been shaped over the last 70 years by a one-party political 
system and its own secretive internal corporate bureaucracy.  This has resulted 
in a tightly controlled organization that is reluctant to participate in continental 
defense arrangements.  In a declassified Department of State cable describing 
strategies for improving the U.S.-Mexican military relationship a military officer 
attached to the Mexican Embassy stated that: 
We will need to deal with the traditional Mexican policy of non-
intervention which make foreign ministry and military establishment 
alike opposed at this time to any form of joint hemispheric defense 
force or other multilateral hemispheric military institution; we must 
recognize that, on these issues, the Mexican military remains an 
extremely conservative institution which looks skeptically on issues 
of international cooperation.19
The events of 9/11, however, have shed new light on the most likely and 
most dangerous threats to our collective security.  Today efforts are underway on 
both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border to reform the national security relationship 
between the two nations in response to increased terrorism fears.20  
Unfortunately, these efforts have not made substantial progress with respect to 
military cooperation.  The past several years have been characterized by 
advances in areas such as the growing rapport among top officers and 
 
19 U.S. Embassy in Mexico, The Mexican Army - Still Passive, Isolated, and Above the Fray? 
May 11, 1995. Confidential cable. National Security Archive FOIA Request. Declassified June 
2003, request no. 24114, 46. Available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB120/doc2.pdf [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
20 Joe Pappalardo, “U.S.-Mexico Rapport Transformed by Terrorist Threat,” National 
Defense Magazine, August 2004. Available at 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Aug/US-Mexico.htm [Accessed June 
2005]. 
cooperation in the counterdrug arena.21  The annual U.S.-Mexican Border 
Commanders’ Conference and other limited high-level exchanges have been 
productive, but concerns of U.S. meddling in Mexico's internal affairs and 
continuing suspicions about U.S. intentions complicate expanding a military 
relationship.22  Based on several interviews, current literature, and existing open 
source programs, the level of U.S.-Mexican military cooperation can be 
categorized somewhere between no cooperation as evidenced by existing 
binational disaster planning to limited collaboration with respect to the war on 
drugs.  Given that defense and security missions overlap binationally, the ideal 
level of military cooperation includes the coordination of planning efforts that 
address common issues that have a defense nexus as reflected in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   Mexican – U.S. Levels of Defense Cooperation 
Despite having a history of frustration, the U.S. and Mexico jointly have an 
enormous stake in the success of North American security.  Transnational 
security threats that exceed the capacity of civil authorities, such as massive 
catastrophic disasters or aerospace threats have binational implications requiring 
coordinated planning efforts for seamless and effective response.  Shared 
security issues like the ones outlined in this chapter can serve as the basis for 
expanding U.S.-Mexican military cooperation and create the synergy that will 
benefit both governments.  Unfortunately, efforts to enhance the U.S.-Mexican 
military-to-military relationship have been hindered by the traditional Mexican 
                                            
21 Graham Turbiville, “Mexico's Evolving Security Posture,” Military Review, May-June 2001. 
Available at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mexico_evolve/mexico_evolve.htm 




                                           
policy of non-intervention and [Mexican] opposition to any form of joint [and 
combined] hemispheric defense force or other multilateral institution.23  
Additionally, Mexico’s insistence on absolute respect for its sovereignty, due to 
historic U.S. incursions on its territory has sharply limited cooperative efforts on 
security issues.24  Fortunately, Mexico’s President Fox recognizes the 
importance of continental security and “a security structure that is 
multidimensional and modern.”25  The next chapter explores the Canadian-U.S. 
defense relationship as a guide for developing a military engagement strategy 
with Mexico in order to strengthen North American security and improve 
USNORTHCOM's ability to accomplish its objectives. 
 
 
23 U.S. Embassy in Mexico, The Mexican Army - Still Passive, Isolated, and Above the Fray? 
May 11, 1995. Confidential cable. National Security Archive FOIA Request. Declassified June 
2003, request no. 24114, 5. Available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB120/doc2.pdf [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
24 Fryer Wesley, Mexican Security (Fulbright-Garcia Robles Grant Proposal, US-Mexico 
Commission for Educational and Cultural Exchange, 1993). Available at 
http://www.wtvi.com/wesley/mexicansecurity.html [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
25 George Kourous, Return of the National Security State? (Background paper from the 
International Relations Center, Americas Program, 2002). Available at http://americas.irc-
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III. CONTINENTAL DEFENSE PLANNING 
Strategic planning is most needed where it is least likely to work, 
and least needed where is most likely to work.26
- Paradox of Strategic Planning 
The absence of strategic military planning, between Mexico and the 
United States in the 21st century is politically irresponsible and dangerous.  
Doctrinally, the military is recognized as one of four instruments of national power 
and its importance cannot be overstated.  Policy and planning between Mexico 
and the U.S., regardless of whether it will ever be exercised, should be 
accomplished immediately in the interests of mutual security.  To facilitate this, 
the Canadian-U.S. defense relationship is used as point of departure for 
developing a U.S.-Mexican military planning strategy.  Canada’s successful 
defense relationship with the U.S. combined with its independent nature and 
status as the U.S. northern neighbor make it an ideal nation to analyze for 
exploring ways to improve the U.S.-Mexican relationship.  This chapter explores 
the military instrument of Canadian and U.S. power to identify and clarify the 
existing binational strategic planning system27 that is currently used to 
understand how policy and planning in the area of defense is created binationally 
so that a similar approach can be developed with Mexico. 
A. CANADIAN - U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE PLANNING 
Canada, like Mexico, is a NAFTA trading partner that is concerned about 
its sovereignty, security, identity, world perception, and ability to affect 
international events.  Yet, as a small nation compared to the U.S., Canada has 
successfully developed a mature defense relationship while maintaining its 
character and influence.  Canada’s proactive engagement with the U.S. across a 
 
26 John Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 3rd ed (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 14-15. 
27 Systems approach looks at our organizations as a unified, purposeful combination of 
interrelated parts, requiring leaders to look at the organization as a whole and understand that 
defense and security activity in one country affects defense and security of all of North America. 
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variety of shared issues has contributed to its prosperity and success.  
Economically, we share the largest bilateral relationship in the world.  
Undefended, the Canadian-U.S. border is evidence of our common political, 
economic, social, and cultural values.  In 2002, over half a trillion dollars in 
goods, services, and investment income were exchanged.  For 35 states, 
Canada is the number one foreign trading partner; it absorbs 23 percent of all 
American exports, and Canada sends 86 percent of all of its exports to the 
United States.  U.S. exports to Canada were three times greater than exports to 
Japan, larger than the total U.S. exports to the European Union, and larger than 
U.S. trade with all countries in Latin America.28  U.S. energy security is 
dependent on Canada as its largest supplier of foreign energy and because we 
are joined together on a common electricity grid.  Aside from the importance of 
our economic interdependencies, Canada and United States share land, 
maritime, and aerospace borders, like Mexico, that must be secured against 
conventional and asymmetric attack.  The September 11th, 2001 attacks made it 
clear that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer insulate our nations and that 
another strike on either country will have significant political and economic 
repercussions.  Fortunately, defense cooperation between Canada and the U.S. 
has a long and productive history.  Formal defense cooperation started during 
World War II with the establishment of the Canadian-U.S. Permanent Joint Board 
on Defense (PJBD) in 1940 whose chairs report directly to the Prime Minister 
and President.  Today, the PJBD is still functioning and it is an integral 
component in the Canadian-U.S. relationship. 
Canadian-U.S. defense planning is derived from several treaties, 
agreements, and plans.  Having an understanding of the relationships between 
these areas can guide the development of a modern U.S.-Mexican defense 
planning process.  At the core of U.S.-Canadian bilateral and binational military 
planning are the overarching political goals of each nation.  In Canada, this is 
expressed in the National Security Policy and in the United States it is reflected 
 
28 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Top 50 Partners in Total U.S. Trade in 2003,” Office of 
Trade and Economy Analysis. Available at 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H03T09.html [Accessed May 2004]. 
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in the National Security Strategy.  When comparing the documents it becomes 
apparent that the interests and values of Canada and United States are very 
similar.  From these documents national military strategy and policy is 
established.  The political policy bridges between the two countries and these 
unilateral military strategies are the agreements and treaties such as the NORAD 
Agreement. 
At the strategic defense level the key policy bridge is the Basic Security 
Document (BSD), which in its current draft form is a six-page overarching 
defense policy document that consolidates the political and military bilateral and 
binational strategic goals and directs for the cooperative defense of Canada and 
the United States, military support civil authorities, and NORAD's mission of 
aerospace defense.  The BSD drives the input into both Canadian and U.S. 
planning systems so that bilateral coordinated activities can occur.  This 
approach to defense planning strengthens binational security while respecting 
each other's national interests and sovereignty because both nations retain their 
own unilateral defense plans.  Coordinated joint defense and defense supported 
missions are executed only if directed by the appropriate civil authority.  This 
planning provides the political leadership in both nations security options for 
binational operations that otherwise would not exist.  The Canadian – U.S. 
strategic planning system, mapped in Figure 6, is a network of connecting 
processes that work together to accomplish bilateral and binational synchronized 
planning.  The vision and output of this system is the protection of our citizens 
from harm and preservation of our way of life.  Although Canada and the United 
States share similar interests, values, and goals, we often have different 
approaches to solving problems yet if our political leadership directed us to 
cooperate in a defense area our military forces could do so effectively. 
 Figure 6.   Canadian – U.S. National Defense Planning Process29 
B. MEXICAN - U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE PLANNING 
Currently, the United States and Mexico do not have a collaborative 
military planning relationship or the strategic bilateral plans to allow for the 
efficient and seamless execution of combined military operations.  For two large 
neighboring democracies that are interdependent in many respects, the absence 
of strategic guidance with respect to military operations is incomprehensible.  
Mexican reluctance to engage the U.S. binationally on defense matters must be 
overcome and this section will address how this can be accomplished. 
Because the success of international policy is a function of diplomacy, 
politics, and necessity, these areas must be emphasized in devising a strategy 
that will engage Mexican defense cooperation.  Like Canada, Mexico and the 
U.S. established a cooperative defense commission at the outset of World War II 
to study problems relating to common defense, planning, and cooperation.  This 
group, known as the Joint U.S.-Mexican Defense Commission, dissolved 
                                            
29 US system is modified as a binational system from the Air War College, United States Air 
Force. The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 2000 (JFSC Pub 1), 4-8. Available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/chapter_4.pdf [Accessed January 25, 2005]. 
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following the war primarily because of the absence of a strategic threat to Mexico 
and cooperative strategic military planning between the nations ceased to exist.  
Today defense coordination and planning between Mexico and the U.S. is 
negligible and severely limits the options our national leaders have for 
responding to events of national and binational significance.  Fortunately, civil 
cooperation, planning, and collaboration are quite extensive.  The border 
governors conference, sister city cross-border contingency plans, and other 
national, regional, and subregional bilateral initiatives enjoy mature and 
comprehensive relationships.  In all of these relationships and plans however, 
there is no mention of military support despite national planning guidance that 
clearly states that defense assets and capability will be used if required and 
directed. 
In a recent U.S.-Mexican public health forum, it was noted that border 
communities are interdependent, thus terrorism preparedness and response 
between the United States and Mexico border-states must be coordinated, 
efficient and seamless.30  Nationally directed bilateral military responses to 
asymmetric and symmetric threats must also be coordinated, efficient, seamless, 
and timely to be effective.  Individually, the United States and Mexico have 
pursued national efforts for terrorism preparedness and there is no coordination 
between national programs.31  To overcome this strategic defense planning gap, 
a U.S.-Mexican defense document similar to the Canadian-U.S. Basic Security 
Document should be developed.  This new document ideally would articulate 
shared Mexican and U.S. national interests and summarize U.S.-Mexican 
strategic defense policy.  Developing this document, as depicted in Figure 7, will 
promote strategic thinking, acting, and learning for both nations’ military and 
political establishments.  Annex I of this thesis contains a draft of the Canadian-
U.S. Basic Security Document, which could serve as a guide for the development 
 
30 United States - Mexico Border Health Commission, Terrorism, Public Health Preparedness 
and Response Planning Forums in the United States-Mexico Border Region. Available at 
http://www.borderhealth.org/public_health_infrastructure.php?curr=border_region [Accessed 
August 9, 2005]. 
31 Ibid. 
of a U.S.-Mexican only document.  A bilateral strategic defense document can 
also provide the national authorization and justification for the politically reluctant 
Mexican military to engage in coordinated bilateral planning efforts with the U.S. 
 
Figure 7.   Mexican – U.S. National Planning 
Applying this planning framework will be complicated by the fact that 
Mexico does not have a publicly documented national security policy or defense 
strategy and because the term “national security” is not a part of the Mexican 
national defense lexicon.  Historically, the term “national security” has been 
avoided by Mexico because of its association with Latin American authoritarian 
regimes.  Recently, however, the term has been reintroduced, but its scope has 
not been defined.32  Additionally, Mexican law does not define “national security” 
as an interest.33
                                            
32 Craig Deare, “Mexico’s Search for a New Military Identity,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 
2000, 72. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1426.pdf [Accessed April 10, 2005]. 
33 Joe Pappalardo, “U.S.-Mexico Rapport Transformed by Terrorist Threat,” National 
Defense Magazine, August 2004. Available at 




                                           
Despite this apparent definitional deficit, Mexico has demonstrated its 
national security policy and defense strategy through its membership in global 
and regional organizations and by application of its military in internal domestic 
events.  Participation in organizations such as the United Nations, Organization 
of American States, and the Strategic Security and Prosperity Partnership of 
North America combined with statements from Mexico's political leadership 
reflect Mexican national security policy.  Furthermore, upon withdrawing Mexico 
from the Rio Treaty in 2002, President Fox stated the need to create “a security 
structure that is multidimensional and modern.”  His declaration reflects Mexican 
national interest.  Clearly, the principal political challenge is for [Western 
Hemisphere] countries to identify the communication links between their 
concepts of defense, national security, and hemispheric security, in order to 
render cooperation possible. 34
In addition to creating a strategic bilateral military document that allows for 
enhanced military cooperation, U.S.-Mexican operational planning considerations 
will have to be addressed so that efficient interoperability would be possible.  
These considerations include universally accepted coalition operation planning 
areas and would be common to all operations.  These areas include: (1) Policy 
and Legal Issues, (2) Communications, (3) Rules of Engagement/Rules of Force, 
(4) Intelligence and Information Sharing, (5) Command-and-Control 
Arrangements and (6) Logistics Support.  Furthermore, each unique military 
operational area could develop its own binational plan that could be annexed into 
a single binational interoperability plan.  For example, military support to 
consequence management operations would be a separate and distinct plan 
from the counter drug operations plan.  Both plans would, however, fall 
underneath the binational military interoperability plan as depicted in Figure 8.  
Ideally, the Canadian-U.S. plan and the U.S.-Mexican plan would be so similar 
that a continental interoperability plan could be easily developed at a future time. 
 
34 Raúl Benítez-Manaut, “Mexico and the New Challenges of Hemispheric Security,” 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 
2004), 27. Available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF18DF.pdf [Accessed May 21, 
2005]. 
 Figure 8.   Bilateral or Trilateral Military Planning Architecture 
This military interoperability plan focuses on joint and combined theater 
strategic operations and the required processes and procedures for seamless 
interaction.  This plan does not commit forces or obligate participation of either 
nation to operations that it does not consider in its national interest.  Furthermore, 
the plan is designed as a guidance document for U.S.-Mexican coalition military 
operations and is adaptive to the political needs of both nations.  For both Mexico 
and the U.S., the reassurance of knowing that their respective militaries could 
operate together if required would improve each nation’s security confidence and 
serve to deter acts of aggression. 
While these steps would vastly improve the U.S.-Mexican security 
posture, the regional nature of binational emergencies demands that more 
should be done to make the military resources and capabilities resident in border 
states accessible to civil authorities.  The next chapter explores the issues 
surrounding the use of National Guard for binational consequence management 
operations and examines the Pacific Northwest arrangements between United 
States and Canada as a case study. 
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IV. CONTINENTAL MUTUAL AID 
Our partnership is committed to the highest results to advance the 
security and well-being of our people.  The partnership is trilateral 
in concept; while allowing any two countries to move forward on an 
issue, it will create a path for the third to join later.35
Joint Statement by President Vicente Fox Quesada, President 
George W. Bush, and Prime Minister Paul Martin March 23, 2005 
 
As the World Trade Center’s South Tower collapsed in smoke and flames 
in New York City on September 11, 2001, Americans around the country 
wondered in horror why the United States was being attacked.  Before the dust 
settled that morning, thousands of New Yorkers rushed home from work to don 
their military uniforms as citizen soldiers.  The same day, New York Governor 
Pataki announced New York National Guard troops were mobilizing and 
preparing for deployment.36  By the afternoon, a federally certified Civil Support 
Team and 2,490 National Guard troops were activated.  Within 24 hours of the 
attack on the World Trade Center, 8,500 New York Army and Air National Guard 
members were supporting New York City providing security and augmenting 
recovery efforts.37  In October 2001, within 72 hours of President Bush's request, 
approximately 8,000 additional Guard members were assisting civil authorities in 
protecting 444 airports around the country.38
The speed of mobilization and deployment displayed in New York by the 
National Guard demonstrates the tremendous capability of the citizen soldier in 
responding to local and regional catastrophic emergencies.  Interstate compacts 
 
35 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, Report to Leaders, June 2005, 4. 
Available at http://www.embamexcan.com/ECONOMY/SPP-report%5B1%5D.pdf [Accessed June 
30, 2005]. 
36 New York State Department of Labor, WTC Response Update: Governor Announces 
Overnight Response. Available at: http://www.labor.state.ny.us/agency/pressrel/aa091201.htm 
[Accessed November 2004]. 
37 U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee Hearing on the FY05 
National Guard & Reserve Budget: Testimony of LTG Steven Blum, ARNG, Chief, National Guard 
Bureau, 2004. Available at http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=220257 
[Accessed November 12, 2004]. 
38 Ibid. 
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that include Mexican and Canadian provinces further enhance this response 
ability by encouraging comprehensive and coordinated civil emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery measures. 
Despite congressionally legislated agreements, a State’s response to a 
border incident using National Guard resources is limited to our domestic 
boundaries under current U.S. law.  Our inability to respond seamlessly to 
binational emergencies with our foreign neighbors is likely to result in the 
needless loss of life and property.  Given this constraint, this chapter examines 
continental emergency management cooperation, identifies issues surrounding 
the use of National Guard forces in cross-border civil support operations, and 
provides recommendations for consideration to overcome statutory barriers that 
are counterproductive to regional, state, and national interests.  This chapter also 
argues that a bilateral civil-military emergency management partnership is a 
potent force for saving lives and preserving property and can serve as the 
foundation for expanding military cooperation with Mexico and Canada.  If 
partnerships are coordinated with our national neighbors, we can create a more 
robust transnational emergency management process.  Doing so will increase 
our collective security, improve our response time, and save more lives in future 
cross-border incidents. 
Today our security environment has changed dramatically and the 
institutions, which defend our continent against common threats, must adapt to 
remain viable otherwise the safety, security, and economic prosperity of North 
America will be in jeopardy.  The World Trade Center attack demonstrated that 
asymmetric threats can approach the U.S. from any direction and that the 
National Guard can provide civil authorities immediate support and capability.  
This attack also reinforced that natural and technological disasters have 
binational consequences and continental impact.  Given this, a noticeable 
missing element in the defense relationship with Canada and Mexico is the 
absence of a formal policy for bilateral military cooperation in support of civil 
authorities.  Also missing is a Mexican defense coordinating presence at NORAD 
and USNORTHCOM.  After all, southern aerospace, maritime, and land 
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approaches to the U.S. are just as important as the northern approaches with 
respect to an attack or supporting consequence management operations.  The 
absence of border area military interaction and cooperation limits the response 
ability, options, and capabilities that can be leveraged against binational 
disasters and events of continental significance. 
A bilateral transnational emergency management framework that 
incorporates a civil-military partnership can serve as the cornerstone upon which 
North American defense can be strengthened.  To achieve this, the Canadian-
U.S. Pacific Northwest emergency management cross-border agreements and 
the role of the National Guard are examined as model for establishing a 
regionally based emergency management structure. 
A. CANADIAN – U.S. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 
Homeland defense and homeland security are top priorities for the 
Governments of Canada and the United States.39  Canadian Prime Minister 
Martin stated that Canada has a desire to deepen “cooperation on mutual 
assistance in the event of major natural or human-caused emergencies” with the 
U.S.40  Similarly, according to the White House, one of the best strategies to 
build capability in communities outside major metropolitan areas is to develop 
mutual aid agreements to share resources.41  While this observation is aimed at 
U.S. communities, this concept is valid for the larger global community as well.  
Canada and the U.S. understood this logic in 1986 when they formalized their 
history of emergency cooperation with the signing of The Agreement Between 
the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States on Co-
Operation in Comprehensive Civil Emergency Planning and Management.42  
 
39 Prime Minister of Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy 
(NSP). Available at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf 
[Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
40 Governor General of Canada, Speech from the Throne, Oct 2004, 13. Available at 
http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sft_e.pdf [Accessed October 2004]. 
41 The White House Website, Policies and Initiatives. Available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/mutualaidagreements [Accessed October 2004]. 
42 Transport Canada, Cooperation and Emergency Preparedness. Available at 
http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/emergency_preparedness/canada_us.htm [Accessed October 
2004]. 
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This agreement recognizes that emergencies can transcend political jurisdictional 
boundaries and that intergovernmental coordination is essential in managing 
these events.  Canada and United States declare in the preamble of this 
agreement the importance of comprehensive civil emergency planning and 
management.  Both countries recognize this idea relates to peacetime 
emergencies stemming from accidents, natural disasters and deliberate acts, and 
to situations of declared or undeclared hostilities, including armed enemy 
attack.43
Building on this bilateral agreement, Congress passed a joint resolution in 
1998 giving consent to the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management 
Arrangement (PNEMA).44  This resolution legalized a regional emergency 
management compact between the States of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and 
Washington, and the Canadian Province of British Columbia, and the Yukon 
Territory.  The fact that Congress passed this Act is significant because it 
acknowledges and authorizes a regional relationship with a foreign country.  The 
aim of the PNEMA Act is to improve regional emergency preparedness, 
response, and cooperation. 
…the Signatories recognize the importance of comprehensive and 
coordinated civil emergency preparedness, response and recovery 
measures for natural and technological emergencies or disasters, 
and for declared or undeclared hostilities including enemy attack.45
The intent of the PNEMA Act is to save lives and protect property by 
coordinating regional planning and response efforts.  The premise is, where 
regional cross-border cooperation exists, respective national interests are 
served.  Response efforts under this Act include resources that are under the 
jurisdiction of a state governor.  Because the PNEMA Act is not intended to 
 
43 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Agreement Between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States on Co-Operation in 
Comprehensive Civil Emergency Planning and Management. Available at http://www.ocipep-
bpiepc.gc.ca/whoweare/em_high_canada_us_e.asp [Accessed December 2004]. 
44 Federal Logic, The Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement. Available at 
http://www.fedlogic.com/Documents/PacificNorthwest_EMA.pdf [Accessed November 2004]. 
45 Ibid. 
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influence foreign policy or infringe on national sovereignty, the ability of a state 
governor to assist its regional foreign neighbors is a win-win policy.  As all 
emergencies are inherently local problems, a regional response will typically be 
timelier than federal action.  In emergencies, resolution effectiveness is based on 
timely response with appropriate resources.  Therefore, a regionally activated 
response will typically be more effective in addressing a disaster.  Depending on 
how the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. Federal Code of Laws are interpreted 
however, using the National Guard as a state emergency management resource 
for a binational emergency is open to debate.  This debate must be resolved in 
favor of granting state governors the maximum flexibility and the authority to 
commit the necessary resources at their disposal to mitigate a binational crisis.  
The next section argues in favor of overcoming these hurdles.  The restrictions 
present in U.S. laws that prevent the use of the National Guard in a non-
federalized status for cross-border regional emergencies need to be 
reconsidered. 
B. ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD 
The National Guard has a unique dual mission that consists of both a 
federal and state role.46  Because of this dual mission, Guard personnel hold 
membership in the National Guard of their state and in the National Guard of the 
United States and this section elaborates on this distinction through the 
examination of U.S. Federal Code to argue in favor of regional cooperation.  
Understanding the intent of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Code of Laws, and 
Congress is essential in determining how the National Guard can be used to 
support a State activated binational emergency response effort. 
1. Federal Role 
According to Federal Code, the purpose of the National Guard is to 
provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed 
forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the 
national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, 
 




                                           
during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and 
qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons 
are needed than are in the regular components.47  Congress or the President 
may activate National Guard units without a governor’s consent as prescribed by 
the public law.  A comparison of duty status for National Guard personnel is 
summarized in Table 1.  The following sections of Title 10 U.S.C. describe the 
federal role of the National Guard and are presented to emphasize national 
responsibilities and considerations that must be taken into account when 
committing forces regionally under state control. 
 
47 United States Code, Purpose of the Reserve Components (10 U.S.C. § 10102). Available 
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_usc&docid=Cite:+10USC 
10102 [Accessed November 2004]. 
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 State Active Duty Title 32 Title 10 
Command & control State Governor State Governor Federal President 
Who performs duty Federally organized National Guard 
Organized National Guard 
in service of U.S.11
AC6, RC and 
National Guard of 
U.S.11
Where duty performed IAW state law CONUS[12] [Worldwide13] Worldwide 
Pay IAW state law Federal pay & allowances Federal pay & allowances 
Federal 
reimbursement 
IAW Stafford Act9 or 
Cooperative 
Agreement10
N/A personnel costs paid by 
Federal funds 
N/A personnel 
costs paid by 
Federal funds 
Tort immunity IAW state law FTCA4 FTCA 
PCA application 1 No No Yes 
USERRA2 No, IAW state law Yes Yes 
SSCRA3 No, IAW state law No Yes 
Mission types IAW state law IDT, AT, state AGR & other Federally authorized 
ODT, ADT, AGR & 
as assigned, subj. 
to PCA 
Discipline State military code State military code UCMJ5
Federal retirement points No Yes Yes 
Other benefits IAW state law Federal Federal 
Medical IAW state law Federal Federal 
Disability IAW state law Federal Federal 
Involuntary order to duty IAW state law Yes7 Yes8
Voluntary order to duty IAW state law Yes  
Table 1.   Comparison of duty status for National Guard personnel under state 
active duty, Title 32 and Title 1048 
Notes: 
1 Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) 
2  Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (38 
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333) 
3  Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. App. §§ 500-548, 560-591) 
4  Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680) 
5  Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §§ 800-946) 
6  Active component 
7  32 U.S.C. §502(f) (1) 
                                            
48 National Governors Association, Comparison of duty status for National Guard personnel 
under state active duty, Title 32 and Title 10. Available at 
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_ISSUE_BRIEF%5ED_2670,00.html 
[Accessed November 2004]. 
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8  Under Presidential Reserve Call-up (10 U.S.C. § 12304); partial 
mobilization (10 U.S.C. § 12302); or full mobilization (10 U.S.C. § 
12301(a)) 
9   Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) for disaster-related activities 
10  Cooperative agreements if to perform an authorized National Guard 
function 
11  10 U.S.C. §§ 3062(c) and 8062(c) 
12  [Title 32 duty for operations is restricted to CONUS] 
13  [Title 32 funding may be used for Title 10 training overseas] 
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12301(a) provides that in time of war or national 
emergency declared by the Congress the entire membership of all reserve 
components or any lesser number can be called to active duty for the duration of 
the war or national emergency plus six months.  Although this statute normally is 
viewed as the call-up authority for responding to a major threat to national 
security, the DOD has stated that it could be used to activate reservists for a 
domestic emergency.49
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12302 provides that, in time of national emergency 
declared by the President, up to 1 million members of the Ready Reserve can be 
called to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months.50  Similar to the 
previous authority, DOD has stated that this statute could also provide access to 
reservists for a domestic emergency, although it has never been used for this 
purpose. 
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12304 provides that, when the President 
determines it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational 
mission, up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve can be called to active 
duty for not more than 270 days.51  This section is known as Presidential 
Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority.  This provision also states that no 
unit or member may be ordered to active duty under this authority to provide 
 
49 United States Code, Reserve Components Generally (10 U.S.C. § 12301(a)). Available at 
http://www.lii.warwick.ac.uk/uscode/10/12301.html [Accessed November 2004]. 
50 United States Code, Ready Reserve (10 U.S.C. § 12302). Available at http://www. 
lii.warwick.ac.uk/uscode/10/12302.html [Accessed November 2004]. 
51 United States Code, Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members; 
order to active duty other than during war or national emergency (10 U.S.C. § 12304). Available 
at http://www.lii.warwick.ac.uk/uscode/10/12304.html [Accessed November 2004]. 
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assistance to either the federal government or a state in time of a serious natural 
or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe.52  Thus, this statute cannot be 
used to mobilize the National Guard reservists for domestic emergencies. 
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12301(b) provides that at any time, a service 
Secretary can order any reservist to active duty for up to 15 days each year.53  
This authority traditionally has been viewed as the authority allowing the services 
to enforce the reservists' 2-week annual training requirement.  However, DOD 
Office of General Counsel provided an interpretation in 1994 stating that this 
authority could be used for operational missions as well as annual active duty for 
training.  The published legal opinion noted that this authority could not be used if 
a unit or member had already completed 15 days of annual training for the 
calendar year.  DOD further noted that this authority has never been used to call 
reservists involuntarily to active duty for a domestic emergency. 
In addition to the involuntary activation of reservists under the above 
conditions, Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12301(d) provides for call-up of reservists who 
volunteer for active duty.  The number of volunteer reservists called to active duty 
and the length of time they may be kept on active duty generally depends upon 
the availability of funds and the end-strength authorization level specified for 
active military. 
Clearly, the National Guard has a federal commitment, but by design is 
reserved for use only when required during national emergencies and times of 
war.  Regional emergencies that do not require federal intervention or a federal 
disaster declaration fall outside of the intent of these statutes and is not 




52 United States Code, Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members; 
order to active duty other than during war or national emergency (10 U.S.C. § 12304). Available 
at http://www.lii.warwick.ac.uk/uscode/10/12304.html [Accessed November 2004]. 
53 United States Code, Reserve Components Generally (10 U.S.C. § 12301(b)). Available at 
http://www.lii.warwick.ac.uk/uscode/10/12301.html [Accessed November 2004]. 
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2. State Role 
When National Guard units are not mobilized under federal control, they 
report to the governor of their respective state or territory.  Each State National 
Guard is governed by unique State law, but in all cases is organized under the 
supervision of an Adjutant General.  Under state law and subordinated to the 
command and control of a State’s governor, the National Guard protects life, and 
property, and preserves peace, order, and public safety.  These missions are 
accomplished through emergency relief support during natural disasters such as 
floods, earthquakes and forest fires; search and rescue operations; support to 
civil defense authorities; maintenance of vital public services and counterdrug 
operations. 
The governor of each state can order the State's Army and Air National 
Guard units to state active duty to help respond to domestic emergencies and 
disasters.  In this capacity, Guard forces are an integral component of a States 
emergency management structure.  If additional assistance is required to 
alleviate a state emergency, a governor can ask for assistance from neighboring 
states using the Emergency Management Assistance Compact or request federal 
support through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).54  With a 
presidential declaration of disaster, FEMA's federal assistance may include 
additional federal (Title 10) military support from DOD.  For the four states that 
are signatories to the PNEMA Act, assistance to participating Canadian 
provinces and territories is possible.  This participation however is based on Title 
32 interpretation and is discussed next. 
Title 32 U.S.C. Section 502(f) provides that guardsmen can be ordered to 
perform additional training and other duty under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of the Army or Secretary of the Air Force.55  This section is the 
authority for allowing Title 32 National Guard forces to operate nationally under 
 
54 For example, see Revised Code of Washington 38.10.010. Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact. Available at 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/RCW/index.cfm?section=38.10.010&fuseaction=section [Accessed 
November 2004]. 
55 United States Code. Required drills and field exercises (32 U.S.C. § 502 (f)). Available at 
http://liimirror.warwick.ac.uk/uscode/32/502.html [Accessed November 2004]. 
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state command and control (see Table 1).  Recognizing the importance of the 
National Guard in Homeland Defense activities, Congress included in the 
passage of the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act a new chapter within 
Title 32 of the Federal Code.  This legislation allows state governors to retain 
command and control of their National Guard forces while performing federally 
funded operational missions in support of homeland defense activities.  Because 
this legislation can be interpreted to include binational operations, the relevant 
sections of Title 32 are highlighted as background for the analysis that follows. 
Title 32 U.S.C. Section 902 states that the Secretary of Defense may 
provide funds to a governor to employ National Guard units or members to 
conduct homeland defense activities that the Secretary, determines to be 
necessary and appropriate for participation by the National Guard units or 
members, as the case may be.56  Title 32 U.S.C. Section 904, provides that 
members of the National Guard performing full-time National Guard duty in the 
Active Guard and Reserve Program may support or execute homeland defense 
activities performed by the National Guard under this chapter [32 USCS §§ 901 
et seq.].57  This duty is limited to 180 days and the governor of the state may, 
with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, extend the period one time for 
an additional 90 days to meet extraordinary circumstances.58  Title 32 U.S.C. 
Section 906 provides that a governor of a state may request funding assistance 
for the homeland defense activities of the National Guard of that State from the 
Secretary of Defense.  Any such request shall include the following:  (1) The 
specific intended homeland defense activities of the National Guard of that State, 
(2) An explanation of why participation of National Guard units or members, as 
 





57 United States Code, Homeland defense duty (32 U.S.C. § 904). Available at http://80-
web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/universe/document?_m=d33d3459ecea3705e56dffed9
e97c0c5&_docnum=7&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=346219055e5dd3257b4cb9073339aa97 
[Accessed November 2004]. 
58 Ibid. 
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the case may be, in the homeland defense activities is necessary and 
appropriate, and (3) A certification that homeland defense activities are to be 
conducted at a time when the personnel involved are not in Federal service.59  
Title 32 U.S.C. Section 907 provides that nothing in this chapter [32 U.S.C.S. §§ 
901 et seq.] shall be construed as a limitation on the authority of any unit of the 
National Guard of a State, when such unit is not in Federal service, to perform 
functions authorized to be performed by the National Guard by the laws of the 
State concerned.60
C. CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT 
The National Guard under the command of a state governor (Title 32) is 
not authorized to participate in foreign military operations due to the constitutional 
relationship that exists between the national and individual state governments. 
The power to make treaties and conduct foreign policy is an exclusive authority 
granted to the Federal government by Article 1, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which states: 
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, 
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement 
or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, 
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of 
delay.61
Further, Presidential authority for command and control over the Armed 
Forces of the United States is made clear in Article 2, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which provides that: 
 





60 United States Code, Relationship to State duty (32 U.S.C. § 907). Available at http://80-
web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/universe/document?_m=d33d3459ecea3705e56dffed9
e97c0c5&_docnum=10&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=5da7137c22f01710361db51f60897c00 
[Accessed November 2004]. 
61 The Constitution of the United States (Article 1, § 10 (3)). Available at 
http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html [Accessed November 9, 2005]. 
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The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States.62
Based on these Constitutional mandates, military operations conducted in 
a foreign country, to include Mexico and Canada, is a national affair and 
therefore a national responsibility.  Consequently, the precedent and policy is 
that individual states are restricted from using Title 32 National Guard forces for 
military operations binationally and internationally.  The authority of the federal 
government is reinforced by the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the contrary notwithstanding.63
Under the Supremacy Clause, everyone must follow federal law in the 
face of conflicting state law.  It has long been established that "a state statute is 
void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute" and that a 
conflict will be found either where compliance with both federal and state law is 
impossible or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.64  Given this 
background, it is established that only Title 10 National Guard forces under the 
command and control of the President are authorized to participate in foreign 
military operations. 
A modernist interpretation could argue that Title 32 National Guard forces 
participating in cross-border disaster relief operations do not interfere with 
national authority and is permissible. Several states, such as Maine and Rhode 
 
62 The Constitution of the United States (Article 2, § 2 (1)). Available at 
http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
63 The Constitution of the United States (Article 6, (2)). Available at 
http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
64 Lectric Law Library Lexicon, Supremacy Clause. Available at 
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s105.htm [Accessed November 2004]. 
42 
                                           
Island would agree.  Many communities in states that border Canada have plans 
to respond to their “foreign” neighbors if required. 
Several reasons exist that support not using the National Guard for 
binational disaster operations.  First, national policy and Federal Law may be 
interpreted so that Title 32 National Guard forces cannot participate in binational 
cross-border emergency relief operations because: 
• The federal government has exclusive authority for international 
military operations and foreign policy. 
• Title 32 National Guard forces are not under the command of the 
President. 
• Federal Law (10 U.S.C. § 12310 (C) 3) explicitly states that select 
reserve duties can only be performed in the United States its 
territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.65 
Second, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that affords legal 
protection to Title 10 forces operating abroad will not apply to Title 32 National 
Guard forces in Canada.  Legal protection for National Guard personnel 
participating binationally must be clarified so that tort issues will not be 
problematic.  Currently, the language of binational emergency management 
compacts does not address this issue adequately.  Lastly, a governor only has 
jurisdiction and authority within the boundaries of his or her state. 
Despite these statutory barriers, several reasons exist to support using 
Title 32 National Guard resources for regional cross-border disaster assistance 
operations.  First, there has been much discussion about expanding the National 
Guard role to perform operational missions under 32 U.S.C. 502(f), which 
provides that guardsmen can be ordered to perform additional training and other 
duty under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or Secretary of 
the Air Force.66  This “other duty” provision has been used as authority for the 
 
65 United States Code, Reserves: for organizing, administering, etc., reserve components (10 
U.S.C. § 12310 (C) 3). Available at 
http://assembler.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00012310----000-.html 
[Accessed November 2004]. 
66 United States Code, Required drills and field exercises (32 U.S.C. § 502 (f)). Available at 
http://liimirror.warwick.ac.uk/uscode/32/502.html [Accessed November 2004]. 
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National Guard to perform national operational missions under the originating 
State’s command and control, including Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil 
Support Teams (WMD-CSTs).  WMD-CSTs are however intentionally restricted 
to domestic operations by Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12310. 
A Reserve may perform duties described in paragraph (1) [Duties 
relating to defense against weapons of mass destruction (i.e. 
WMD-CSTs)] only while assigned to a reserve component rapid 
assessment element team and performing those duties within the 
geographical limits of the United States, its territories and 
possessions, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico.67
Even if WMD-CSTs are federalized, they are still restricted to domestic 
operations putting their capability out of reach of Canada and Mexico.  National 
Guard forces other then WMD-CSTs do not have this restriction. 
Second, to maintain readiness for federal duty, the National Guard 
performs training in Title 32 status.  Title 32 does not specify where training must 
take place resulting in training conducted throughout the U.S. and at times 
internationally. If units deploy outside the U.S. they must however be in Title 10 
status even though it is Title 32 funded. 
Soldiers deploying outside of Continental U.S. (CONUS) must be 
placed under the command of the gaining OCONUS (Outside 
CONUS) command in accordance with Title 10, United States Code 
(10 USC). Army National Guard soldiers must have a statement on 
their orders changing their status from Title 32, United States Code 
(32 USC) to Title 10. The gaining OCONUS command assumes 
Uniform Code of Military Justice authority over all RC [Reserve 
Component] soldiers upon their arrival in theater.68
For example, units from all states regularly train at the Joint Readiness 
Training Center in Louisiana. Further, units exercise with foreign militaries such 
as the Rhode Island Army National Guard conducting annual training in  
67 United States Code, Reserves: for organizing, administering, etc., reserve components (10 
U.S.C. § 12310 (C) 3). Available at 
http://assembler.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00012310----000-.html 
[Accessed November 2004]. 
68 U.S. Army, Command and Control, Army Regulation 350–9, Overseas Deployment 
Training, Chap. 4, 2. Available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r350_9.pdf [Accessed 
August 9, 2005]. 
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Gagetown, New Brunswick, Canada.69  This accepted practice of by the chain of 
command (i.e. the President and DOD) provides a precedent for deploying Title 
32 National Guard forces in support of foreign regional requests for disaster 
assistance. 
Third, the relationships that exist locally and regionally along the border 
between Mexico, Canada, and the United States are strong and support mutual 
aid.  Additionally, in the case of Canada, regional National Guard and Canadian 
Forces have established training relationships.  For example, Northern tier state 
National Guard forces have trained in Canada and Canadian Forces have 
participated in training in the U.S.  Moreover, units have participated in various 
regional missions such as OPERATION SECURE BORDERS (15 Jan - 30 Jun 
2002) in Title 10 status with their Canadian counterparts.  Further, regional 
mutual aid at the request of a Canadian province is not making foreign policy or 
an infringing on national sovereignty. 
Fourth, on October 28, 2004 the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act 
was signed into law allowing federal funding of National Guard domestic 
operations.  Prior to this legislation, all Title 32 missions were conducted for 
training purposes only.  Now, this law makes it possible for Guard members to 
perform, in Title 32 status, homeland defense activities in support of the 
Secretary of Defense and the states.70  State governors now may retain 
command and control of their National Guard forces while performing operational 
federal missions.  By empowering the State with federal authority, Title 32 cross-
border regional operations are possible depending upon the extent to which this 
authority is interpreted.  Further, under Title 32 U.S.C. Sections 904 and 906 the 
National Guard can potentially support the congressionally ratified PNEMA Act in 
neighboring Canadian provinces and territories in response to “declared or 
undeclared hostilities including enemy attack.”71
 
69 Brian O’Connors, USNORTHCOM National Guard Bureau Liaison Office, email message 
to author, December 13, 2004. 
70 Bob Haskell, “Homeland Funding,” National Guard Bureau Website. Available at 
http://www.ngb.army.mil/news/story.asp?id=1331 [Accessed November 2004]. 
71 Ibid. 
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Fifth, by empowering the states with Title 32 operational funding, the 
general welfare and safety of citizens is enhanced because the agility of 
decentralized authority will speed decision to action time for responding to a 
crisis because the National Guard is permanently prepositioned in the 
communities near border areas.  Army Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau recently noted that, “you can't drive 25 miles in any 
direction in a populated area without running into a National Guard armory."72
Sixth, this distribution of capabilities is an economy of force approach to 
addressing the threat of multiple simultaneous events.  Taxpayers’ benefit 
because it is cost effective to have a well trained part-time distributed force that is 
able to respond immediately and effectively to a crisis versus a full-time 
centralized force that will have a longer reaction time.  After all, the first 12 - 72 
hours after a disaster are the most critical.73  When an event occurs that 
overwhelms local and state civil resources the speed and capability of the 
National Guard under the command and control of a state governor is 
unmatched. 
Lastly, the Bush Administration recognizes and supports mutual aid as an 
established mechanism for sharing or pooling limited resources to augment 
existing capabilities and supplementing jurisdictions that have exhausted existing 
resources due to disaster.74  Congress also recognizes and supports regional 
mutual aid through The Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States on Co-Operation in Comprehensive Civil 
Emergency Planning and Management and the Pacific Northwest Emergency 
Management Arrangement Act.  This Agreement and Act provide that: 
 
72 Donna Miles, “Guard's Homeland Defense Mission Continues, 368 Years Later.” American 
Forces Information Service. Available at 
http://www.dod.gov/news/Dec2004/n12132004_2004121302.html [Accessed December 2004]. 
73 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Community Emergency Response Team. 
Available at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/CERT/c_wv.htm [Accessed November 2004]. 
74 The White House Website, Policies and Initiatives. Available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/mutualaidagreements [Accessed October 2004]. 
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Authorities of either country may request the assistance of the other 
country in seeking appropriate alleviation if the normal application 
of law in either country might lead to delay or difficulty in the rapid 
execution of necessary civil emergency measures.75
Similarly, the Agreement on Cooperation in Cases of Natural Disasters 
signed in 1980 with Mexico addresses disaster assistance. For these reasons, 
Title 32 National Guard forces should be authorized to assist their regional 
foreign neighbors in disaster relief operations if requested by their governments 
and it is in the interest of the United States. 
 
75 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Agreement Between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States on Co-Operation in 
Comprehensive Civil Emergency Planning and Management. Available at http://www.ocipep-
bpiepc.gc.ca/whoweare/em_high_canada_us_e.asp [Accessed December 2004]. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
To make North America secure for the future, we need integrated, 
coordinated and seamless measures in place at, within, and 
beyond our borders to provide our people and our infrastructure 
with the highest possible common level of protection from terrorists 
and other criminal elements, as well as from the common threats of 
nature.76
Joint Statement by President Vicente Fox Quesada, President 
George W. Bush, and Prime Minister Paul Martin March 23, 2005 
The U.S.-Mexican binational security architecture is fundamentally 
inadequate if it does not include military cooperation and planning.  Because 
military assistance to civil authorities for consequence management operations is 
supported in Mexico and the U.S., a bilateral transnational emergency 
management framework that incorporates a civil-military partnership can serve 
as the cornerstone upon which U.S.-Mexican defense relationships can be built. 
Responding to a foreign regional emergency management request is not a 
threat to sovereignty or the national authority of the Federal government.  
Therefore, states that border Canada and Mexico should be authorized by law 
with authority to use Title 32 National Guard forces for binational regional 
emergency civil support operations provided that: 
• Congress has approved an existing emergency management 
compact or other arrangement for the involved participants. 
• It is in the interests of the United States. 
• The request is coordinated with the Department of State and DHS. 
• Other non-military means are incapable of achieving required 
objectives. 
• Use of military resources is selective and limited. 
The decision to order Title 32 National Guard forces to support binational 
disaster operations focuses on the unique capabilities and resources the military  
76 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, Report to Leaders, June 2005. 
Available at http://www.embamexcan.com/ECONOMY/SPP-report%5B1%5D.pdf [Accessed June 
30, 2005]. 
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can bring to bear, rather than on its combat power. Generally, the military is not 
the best tool for civil concerns, but under certain conditions use of military forces 
may be appropriate. These conditions exist when: 
• The scale of a catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian agencies to 
respond. 
• When the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the 
ability to provide an immediate response. 
• When the military is needed to establish the preconditions 
necessary for effective application of other instruments of national 
power. 
• When a binational crisis could affect ongoing combat operations. 
• When a response requires unique military resources. 
• Military forces should only be used if they are likely to accomplish 
their objectives. 
All Title 32 National Guard cross-border efforts should be limited in 
duration, have a clearly defined mission and end state, entail minimal risk to 
lives, and be designed to support the host nation and work within their 
emergency management structure. 
With the approval of the Department of State, DOD, and their Mexican 
counterparts a U.S.-Mexican planning group composed of civil and military 
members should be formed to create a binational military support agreement that 
specifies the roles, responsibilities, and restrictions for military support to civil 
authorities in binational emergency management situations. 
Once the civil-military partnerships are established and functioning 
regionally, a more encompassing national effort can be made to establish a U.S.-
Mexican binational strategic planning process.  The first step in this process is to 
develop a political policy document that reflects binational values and military 
strategy.  The second step is to develop a binational interoperability plan that 
captures the considerations that are applicable to all binational operations. 
The environments in which public and nonprofit organizations operate 
have become not only increasingly uncertain in recent years but also more tightly 
interconnected; thus changes anywhere in the system reverberate unpredictably 
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– and often chaotically and dangerously – throughout society.77  This is 
particularly true in the domestic and continental security environment where 
symmetric and asymmetric threats have the potential to utilize weapons of mass 
destruction.  Faced with such lethal outcomes, strategic binational defense 
planning is critical not only for the survival and long-term prosperity of the United 
States, but for the entire continent. 
Binational emergencies are inevitable and the civil-military emergency 
management partnership is a potent force for saving lives and preserving 
property that can be made more powerful if used in concert with our national 
neighbors.  Eventually, a situation will arise that will require a collaborative civil-
military emergency management response with Mexico.  If military capability is 
requested and appropriate, states participating in binational planning efforts with 
their regional Mexican neighbors should have the authority to order Title 32 
National Guard forces to assist.  Politically, the Bush Administration, the U.S. 
Congress, and Mexican President Fox have demonstrated their support for 
increased security cooperation and regional mutual aid.  As neighboring 
democracies that share common values, action is needed today to develop 
binational U.S.-Mexican civil-military cooperation for consequence management 
operations. 
 
77 John Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 3rd ed. (San 
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APPENDIX 





The purpose of the Basic Defense Document (BDD) is to provide strategic 
guidance to senior military leaders for the defence of Canada and the United 
States.  The BDD identifies the military defense objectives derived from political 
goals, outlined in government policy documents including, but not limited to, the 
1940 Ogdensburg Declaration, the Canadian National Security Policy, and the 
United States National Security Strategy.  In addition, it establishes the 
overarching framework for Canada-United States (CANUS) Region78 military 
cooperation and provides strategic direction for bi-national military planning. 
 
2. GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. 
 
The geostrategic environment for North America has evolved significantly 
over the last century.  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
the rise of global terrorism have added new dimensions to the traditional view of 
continental defense.  Today we must be prepared to address, with suitable 
capabilities, the aerospace, land, maritime and information operations, and other 
threats that could endanger Canada and the U.S.  These threats may include 
state and non-state actors that sympathize with terrorist activities or permit the 
transit of illegal material (such as drugs, weapons, explosives, etc…) or persons 
bound for the CANUS Region.  A full description of the threat to North America 
can be found in the current version of the CANUS North American Security 
Assessment. 
 
3. NATIONAL SECURITY VISIONS. 
 
Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin and U.S. President George W. Bush 
reaffirmed a common security vision in statements made during President Bush’s 
visit to Canada on November 30, 2004. 
 
• “President Bush and I are well aware that the prosperity of our nations, our 
status as open societies, and the well-being of our democratic institutions are 
linked now to the integrity of our collective security.” 
- Prime Minister Paul Martin 
 
                                            
78 The CANUS Region is defined as a) CANADA; b) continental UNITED STATES, including 
Alaska; and c) Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands, and includes air space above the 
Territorial Seas.  
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• “The relationship between Canada and the United States is indispensable to 
peace and prosperity on the North American continent.” 
- President George W. Bush 
 
• “…we will continue to explore new and innovative ways to enhance relations 
with the United States to defend the continent.”   
- Canada’s International Policy Statement 19 April 2005 
 
Likewise, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of 
America identifies that: 
 
“…there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can 
accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and 
friends in Canada and Europe.”79
 
Canada and the United States must be able to act wherever our interests 
are threatened.  To achieve this partnership we must: 
 
- Enhance information and intelligence sharing between our two nations 
by moving from a “need to know” paradigm to a “need to share” 
premise that is essential to the security and defence of Canada and 
the U.S. 
 
• Ensure we remove all obstacles to sharing defense-to-defence 
and military-to-military information and intelligence; establish 
flexible and credible protocols, processes, and supporting 
capabilities to expand the sharing of information and intelligence 
with non-defense and non-federal agencies and organizations at 
the state, province, and local levels across both nations. 
 
• Develop net centric capabilities between our two nations to 
support CANUS Command structures and nation-to-nation 
information sharing at all levels for the mutual defense of North 
America. 
 
- Ensure that the military forces of our nations have appropriate 
resources to contribute to the mutual defense of North America; 
 
- Develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become 
effective multinational fighting forces; 
 
- Take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of 
scale in our defense spending to transform our military forces so that 
they defeat potential aggressors and diminish our vulnerabilities; 
 
79 The White House, National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America, 25. 
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
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- Streamline and increase the flexibility of CANUS command structures 
to meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of 
training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations; 
and 
 
- Maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as we take 
the necessary steps to transform and modernize our forces.80 
 
The Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) stated that the “U.S. is 
Canada’s most important ally and defence partner [and] it is in Canada’s national 
interest to work collaboratively with the U.S. to strengthen continental security.”81  
Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has identified that a 
primary objective of U.S. security cooperation is to work closely with our friends 
and allies to deter aggression or coercion.82  The overall objective of defending 
our nations against common enemies is the same.  In addition, these documents 
recognize that working together; we can create synergies, with a view toward 
enhanced information sharing, defense, and security of Canada and the United 
States, so that our societies and citizens continue to prosper in a safe and free 
environment. 
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS. 
 
Operations may range from defending the CANUS Region against full-
scale attack to providing assistance to civil authorities.  Canadian and U.S. 
military forces must be prepared to defend against any type of attack.  National 
military forces are essential for maintaining sovereignty and are fundamental to 
the right to act unilaterally; however, there are circumstances pertaining to the 
CANUS Region wherein Canada and the U.S. will choose to act together.  In 
view of the foregoing political guidance, the following bi-national strategic military 
objectives are addressed by this BDD and its supporting documents: 
 
- Secure Canada and the United States against all types of attack to 
ensure territorial integrity and the survival of both nations; 
 
- Strengthen our alliance and partnership to address common 
challenges in bi-national defense; and 
 
 
80The White House, National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America, 25. 
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
81 Chief of the Defence Staff, A Time for Transformation: Annual Report 2002-2003, 26. 
Available at http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/anrpt2003/intro_e.asp [Accessed August 9, 2005]. 
82 Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military 
Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Fall 2003, 6. Available at 
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf [Accessed April 
15, 2005]. 
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- Assist each other, as required, in providing assistance to civil 
authorities for continent-wide emergency management. 
Close coordination between Commander, NORAD (CDRNORAD), 
Commander U.S. Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), and the 
Commander, Canada Command is essential to achieve these military objectives.  
Therefore, three mechanisms are essential to enhance bi-national military 
cooperation: 
 
a. NORAD CONPLAN “Aerospace Warning and Aerospace Control of 
North America”. 
 
b. CANUS Combined Defense Plan. 
 
c. CANUS Civil Assistance Plan. 
 
NORAD CONPLAN "AEROSPACE WARNING AND AEROSPACE CONTROL 
OF NORTH AMERICA”.  The purpose of this plan is to provide the basis of day-
to-day aerospace defense, aerospace surveillance, air sovereignty operations, 
and counter drug operations in North America.  CDRNORAD is responsible for 
deliberate planning for the aerospace warning and aerospace control of North 
America as defined by the NORAD Agreement.  
 
COMBINED DEFENSE PLAN (CDP).  The purpose of the CDP is to provide the 
framework for the execution of the combined and joint military operations to 
maintain the defense and the security of the CANUS Region during peace, 
contingencies, and war.  In recognition of a significant overlap between national 
defense and national security, the CDP will address the synchronization of bi-
national military efforts into a coherent bi-national plan.  Chief of the Defence 
Staff (CDS) and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) are the approval 
authorities; Commander, Canada Command and Commander, USNORTHCOM 
are the designated planning agents, responsible for the production of the CDP.  
The CDP will at a minimum address bi-national: 
 
a. Maritime domain awareness; 
 
b. Shared situational awareness between defense and security agencies; 
 
c. Defensive Information operations (IO); 
 
d. Coordination with NORAD for aerospace defense; 
 
e. Joint and combined defense against symmetric and asymmetric threats; 
and 
 
f. Defense Support to Civil Authorities. 
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CIVIL ASSISTANCE PLAN (CAP).  The purpose of this plan is to provide the 
framework for the military of one nation to provide support to the military of the 
other nation, which is providing support to civil authorities under the provision of 
the Canadian National Defence Act or the U.S. National Response Plan. 
Commander, Canada Command and Commander, USNORTHCOM are the 
designated planning agents for the development of the CAP. The CAP will at a 
minimum address: 
 
a. Request and approval process for bi-national military support to civil 
authorities; 
 
b. Procedures for a rapid military-to-military cooperation in response to 
requests for defense support to civil authorities; 
 
c. Bi-national military information sharing; and 
 
d. The requirement for bi-national planning, training, and exercises. 
 
5. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
All operations pursuant to this BDD and supporting plans will comply with 




(1) International law recognizes the inherent right of a sovereign 
state, either alone or in conjunction with allies, to use military force 
in national self-defense. 
 
(2) Procedures for crossing the CANUS border will comply with 
existing national laws and bi-national agreements. Deployments of 
U.S. forces to CANADA or vice versa must be agreed to by each 
nation. 
 
(3) The armed forces of Canada and the U.S. have differing legal 
obligations with regard to armed conflict. Each nation’s military will 
adhere to its obligations under the international treaties to which it 




(1) United States - Federal and state statutes circumscribe the 
ability of U.S. armed forces to assist civilian law enforcement and 
other agencies. The authority for use of force is also very narrowly 
defined in statutes, regulations, and court decisions. 
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(2) Canada - Canadian Forces may support Canadian federal or 
provincial law enforcement agencies, if requested in accordance 
with mechanisms set by Canadian law. 
 
6. REVIEW AND REVISION CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
Acknowledgment is made that this BDD will be reviewed upon Canada 
Command’s commencement of operations in April 2006 and implementation of a 
new NORAD Agreement in May 2006.  Further reviews of the BDD shall not be 
constrained or required in a specific period of time.  The BDD may remain in 
effect indefinitely, until superseded by agreement of the two nations.  Either 




This document provides the strategic framework for enhanced military 
cooperation between Canada and the United States.  The supporting documents 
will enable both militaries to provide the detail necessary to fulfill the security 
visions of Canada and the United States. 
 
The Basic Security Document, MCC 100-35, dated August 20, 1999, is 
superseded upon receipt of this document.  Contingent upon the consent of the 
Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), the BDD will cease using a MCC 
numbering system.  Dates will identify the current signed and approved version 





RICK HILLIER     RICHARD B. MYERS 
General, CF      General, USAF 
Chief of Defence Staff    Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
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